Fragmento de corrección de trabajo doctoral realizada para Köln Universität, Alemania

(11/11/2009)
2. On Kantian Spinozism

Kant´s Spinozism is connected with two groups of ideas that are terminologically connected but which are conceptually different. Thus the central term of both groups is God. However the concept in the first and the second sense is never unified by Kant -this is why it is important to keep them separately-.
The first concept of God that Kant connects with Spinoza´s name is a practical idea. This idea of God is, strictly speaking, the Kantian idea of God which can be summarized by the idea of an Ens summum, summa intelligentia and summum bonum that, according to Kant, depends on the categorical imperative. That is the idea of God as a supreme personality or the idea of a supreme being that has absolute rights and no obligations.
The already mention phrase “to intuit all in God” connected with Spinoza´s thought is related first of all to this practical idea of God. Let’s see, for example:

The transcendental ideality of the subject thinking itself makes itself into a person. Its divinity. I am in the highest being. According to Spinoza, I see myself in God who is legislative within me. AA, XXII, 54.
Die transc. Idealität des sich selbst denkenden Subject macht sich selbst zu einer Person. Die Göttlichkeit derselben. Ich bin im höchsten Wesen. Ich sehe mich selbst (nach Spinoza) in Gott, der in mir gesetzgebend ist.


According to Spinoza´s transcendental idealism, we intuit ourselves in God. The categorical imperative does no presuppose a highest commanding substance as outside me, but lies within my own reason. AA, XXII, 56.
Wir schauen uns nach dem Transsc. Idealism des Spinoza in Gott an. Der categorische Imperativ setzt nicht eine höchst gebietende Substanze voraus die ausser mir ist sondern in meiner Vernunf liegt.


The fact that we can “intuit us in God” while God is the idea above outlined it is only possible if this supreme subject that is external to us lives, at the some time, inside of us. The philosopher is more radical than ever before when he asserts now that God is not a substance outside of me but the idea of a supreme legislator that justifies or commends me internally. He seems to be more willing to recognize the implications of his old idea of regarding human duties as divine commandments, idea that now he repeats. This first use of the name of Spinoza in OP will at the end carry out to the unification of practical reason and God. Kant says:


God is not a being outside of me but a mere thought in me. God is Reason that gives itself moral practical law. Thus only an God in me, around me and over me. AA, XXI, 145.

Gott ist nicht ein Wesen außer Mir sondern blos ein Gedanke in Mir Gott ist die moralisch//practische sich selbst gesetzgebende Vernunft — Daher nur ein Gott in mir um mich und über mir. AA, XXI, 145.

Let’s pay attention that this mentioned unification is not the same as the unification of God and nature or of God and Subject. The Kantian unification of God and practical reason leaves out of the synonymy precisely the whole reign of sensible world. In this perspective, natural world is the concept of a being –as Kant expressively asserts- that has only obligations and no rights .
Secondly there is another group of ideas that Kant connects with Spinoza´s name in OP. This is about the “God of Spinoza”. The “God of Spinoza” is not, properly speaking, God. If God is the idea of an Ens Summum, summa intelligentia and summum bonum or briefly as the idea of moral law, then the “God of Spinoza” is not that being. The God of Spinoza is –as Kant affirms briefly- human spirit from a formal point of view. ("...")